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Abstract
This paper generalizes the results in Aswal et al. (2003) on dictatorial domains.
This is done in two ways. In the first, the notion of connections between pairs of
alternatives in Aswal et al. (2003) is weakened to weak connectedness. This notion re-
quires the specification of four preference orderings for every alternative pair. Domains
that are linked in the sense of Aswal et al. (2003) with weak connectedness replacing
connectedness, are shown to be dictatorial. In the second, the notion of connections
for alternative pairs is strengthened relative to its counterpart in Aswal et al. (2003).
However, a domain is shown to be dictatorial if the induced graph is merely connected
rather than linked. This result generalizes the result in Sato (2010) on circular domains.
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1 Introduction
The incompatibility between strategy-proofness and non-dictatorship is a major issue in
social choice. The seminal result of Gibbard (1977) and Satterthwaite (1975) states that
a surjective and strategy-proof social choice function (scf) with a range of at least three
alternatives, defined over the complete domain, is dictatorial. Aswal et al. (2003) show that
the assumption of a complete domain is far from being necessary for this result. They
show that a large class of domains (including several that are “small”) are dictatorial -
i.e. domains with the property that all strategy-proof and unanimous scfs (with a range of
at least three) defined over such domains, are dictatorial. A complete characterization of
dictatorial domains is a natural objective but appears to difficult to provide. Our goal in this
paper is to generalize the sufficiency result of Aswal et al. (2003) and unify existing results
in the area.
It will be helpful to briefly recount the result of Aswal et al. (2003). Fix an arbitrary
domain. They say that two alternatives a and b are connected if there exists a preference in
the domain where a is ranked first and b, second and another preference where the reverse
is true. They consider the following graph: each alternative is a vertex and there is an edge
between a pair of vertices if the two alternatives represented by the vertices, are connected.
A domain is linked if this graph is “sufficiently dense”. Specifically, there should exist an
arrangement of the vertices such that the first three are mutually connected and each vertex
is connected to at least two in the set of vertices that precedes it. Their main result is that
every linked domain is dictatorial. They show the existence of a variety of linked domains
including those that are linear in the number of alternatives. However, this result is far from
a characterization - for instance, the circular domains defined in Sato (2010) and are not
linked.
We generalize the linked domain result in two ways. The first way is to weaken the
notion of connectedness between a pair of alternatives to weak connectedness while retaining
the “connection structure” of the induced graph as in linkedness. The second way is to
strengthen the notion of connectedness to strong connectedness but weakening the “connec-
tion structure” on the induced graph.
Two alternatives a and b are weakly connected if there exists a (possibly empty) set of
alternatives B and four orderings in the domain such that there is a reversal between B
and b when a is top-ranked and there is a reversal between B and a when b is top-ranked.
Reversality requires alternatives between a and b to belong to B in the case where B is
better than b. Similarly, alternatives between b and a to belong to B in the case where
B is better than a. A domain is called a β domain if we can arrange all the alternatives
(vertices in the induced graph) in a way that the first three are mutually weakly connected
and each alternative is weakly connected to at least two in the set of alternatives (vertices)
that precedes it. Our first result is that β domains are dictatorial. These domains are
obviously supersets of linked domains - it is also possible to find β domains that are smaller
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than any linked domain.
Strong connectedness between a and b requires the following “intermediateness” property
in addition to weak connectedness: for any alternative c other than a and b, there exists
two orderings in the domain, one where c is above b while a at the top and another where
c is above a while b at the top. A domain is called a γ domain if its induced graph is
connected in the usual graph-theoretic sense, i.e. there exists a path between any two
alternatives(vertices). Our second result is that all γ domains whose induced graph is not a
star-graph, are dictatorial domains. The same result holds in the star-graph case with mild
additional conditions. These results generalize results on circular domains in Sato (2010)
and Chatterji and Sen (2011). Finally, we apply our result to a facility location problem in
a restricted environment.
The paper is organized as followed. Section 2 contains a description of the model. Sections
3 and 4 contain the results on β and γ domains respectively. Section 5 provides an application
while Section 6 concludes.
2 Basic notation and definitions
Let A = {a1, . . . , am} denote a finite set of alternatives with m ≥ 3. Let I = {1, 2, . . . , n},
n ≥ 2 be a finite set of agents. Let P denote the set of strict orderings 1 of the elements of
A. An admissible domain is a set D ⊂ P. A typical preference orderings will be denoted by
Pi where aPib will signify that a is preferred (strictly) to b under Pi. A preference profile
is an element of the set Dn. Preference profiles will be denoted by P, P¯ , P ′ etc and their ith
components as Pi, P¯i, P
′
i respectively with i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Let (P¯i, P−i) denote the preference
profile where the ith component of the profile P is replaced by P¯i.
Given Pi ∈ D, let rk(Pi) denote the k
th ranked alternative in Pi, k = 1, . . . ,m, i.e.,
[rk(Pi) = aj] ⇒ [|{ak ∈ A : akPiaj}| = k − 1]. For an ordering Pi ∈ D and aj ∈ A, we let
B(aj, Pi) denote the set of alternatives that are strictly better than aj according to Pi, while
W (aj, Pi) denotes the set of alternatives that are strictly worse than aj according to Pi. Let
M(aj, ak, Pi) be the set alternatives that are strictly worse than aj and strictly better than
ak according to Pi.
Definition 1 A social choice function (scf) f is a mapping f : Dn 7−→ A.
Some familiar properties of scfs are stated below.
Definition 2 A scf f satisfies unanimity, if for all P ∈ Dn, f(P ) = a whenever a = r1(Pi)
for all i ∈ I.
If an alternative is top-ranked by all voters, the scf must pick that alternative.
A scf is strategy-proof if no voter can obtain a strictly better alternative by misrepre-
senting her preferences for any announcements of preferences of the other voters.
1A strict ordering is a complete, transitive and antisymmetric binary relation.
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Definition 3 A scf f : P→ A is manipulable by agent i at a profile P ∈ P via P ′i if
f(P ′i , P−i)Pif(P ).
A scf f is strategy-proof if it is not manipulable by any agent at any profile.
A scf is a dictatorship if a particular voter always gets her best alternative.
Definition 4 A scf f is dictatorial if there is an individual i ∈ I such that f(P ) = r1(Pi)
for all P ∈ Dn
The following well-known result provides a full characterization of strategy-proof scfs for
the domain P.
Theorem 1 (Gibbard (1977),Satterthwaite (1975)) A scf f : Pn → A is strategy-proof and
satisfies unanimity if and only if it is dictatorial.
Unfortunately, there is a large class of preference domains where strategy-proofness im-
plies dictatorship, so that there is no escape from this unpleasant dilemma. These domains
which we define formally below, are the objects of our study.
Definition 5 The domain D ⊂ P is dictatorial if, for all scfs f : Dn 7−→ A is strategyproof
and satisfies unanimity implies f is dictatorial.
Throughout the paper, we shall restrict attention to domains that are minimally rich.
Definition 6 A domain D is minimally rich if, for all a ∈ A, there exists Pi ∈ D such that
r1(Pi) = a.
The minimal richness assumption guarantees that every alternative is top-ranked for
some ordering in the domain. This is a standard assumption in the literature, for instance
Aswal et al. (2003).
3 β Domains
We first introduce the notion of weak connectedness. In what follows, we fix a domain D ⊂ P.
Definition 7 A pair of alternatives aj, ak is weakly connected, denoted by aj
w
∼ ak if there
exists B ⊂ A (possibly empty) and Pi, P¯i, P
′
i , P
′′
i ∈ D such that
1. r1(Pi) = r1(P¯i) = aj and r1(P
′
i ) = r1(P
′′
i ) = ak.
2. B = M(aj, ak, Pi) and B ⊂ W (ak, P¯i).
3. B = M(ak, aj, P
′
i ) and B ⊂ W (aj, P
′′
i ).
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Pi P¯i P
′
i P
′′
i
aj aj ak ak
B . B .
ak ak aj aj
. B . .
. . . B
. . . .
Table 1: Weak connectedness
The weak connectedness concept is illustrated below.
The idea is quite simple. There exists a set B such that there is a reversal between B and
ak when aj is top-ranked and there is a reversal between B and aj when ak is top-ranked.
Reversality requires all alternatives between aj and ak to belong to B in the case where B
is better than ak. Similarly, all alternatives between ak and aj to belong to B in the case
where B is better than aj.
Observation 1 In case B is the empty set, weak connectedness reduces to connectedness
in the sense of Aswal et al. (2003).
A β domain can be defined in the same way that a linked domain was defined in
Aswal et al. (2003).
Definition 8 Let B ⊂ A and let aj /∈ B. Then aj is linked to B if there exists ak, ar ∈ B
such that aj
w
∼ ak and aj
w
∼ ar.
Definition 9 The domain D is called a β domain if there exists a one to one function
σ : {1, . . . ,m} → {1, . . . ,m} such that
(i) aσ(1)
w
∼ aσ(2)
(ii) aj is linked to {aσ(1), aσ(2), . . . , aσ(j−1)}, j = 3, . . . ,m.
By virtue of Observation 1, linked domains are β domain. However, the converse is not
true as the example below shows.
Example 1 Let A = {a1, a2, a3, a4} and let D¯ be the domain in Table 2. It is clear that
a1 is connected to a2 and a3, a2 is connected to a3, but a4 is not connected to any other
alternatives. Therefore D¯ is not linked. But it is a β domain because a4
w
∼ a1 and a4
w
∼ a2.
It is helpful to interpret a β domain in terms of the graphs induced by weak connectedness.
Let D be a domain. The graph G(D) is defined as follows: the vertices of the graph are the
alternatives and two vertices have an edge iff the alternatives represented by the vertices are
weakly connected. The graph induced by the domain in Example 1 is shown in Figure 1.
Our first Theorem shows that the linked domain result in Aswal et al. (2003) can be
generalized to β domains.
5
P 1i P
2
i P
3
i P
4
i P
5
i P
6
i P
7
i P
8
i
a1 a1 a2 a2 a3 a3 a4 a4
a2 a3 a1 a3 a1 a2 a1 a2
a4 a4 a4 a4 a2 a1 a2 a1
a3 a2 a3 a1 a4 a4 a3 a3
Table 2: The domain D¯
a1
a3 a2
a4
Figure 1: The graph G(D¯)
Theorem 2 A β domain is a dictatorial domain.
Proof : Let D be a β domain and assume without loss of generality that the function σ
in definition 9 is the identity function. For every non-empty X ⊂ A, we let DX = {Pi ∈
D|r1(Pi) ∈ X}. Similarly, for any alternative ai ∈ A, we let D
ai = {Pi ∈ D|r1(Pi) = ai}.
In view of Proposition 3.1 of Aswal et al. (2003) and our assumption of minimal richness,
it suffices to show that if f : D2 → A is strategy-proof and unanimous, then f is dictatorial.
The following Lemma is very general.
Lemma 1 Let D be an arbitrary domain and let a, b be arbitrary alternatives with a
w
∼ b. If
f : D2 → A satisfies strategy-proofness and unanimity, then f(P ) ∈ {a, b} for all P ∈ D2
such that r1(P1), r1(P2) ∈ {a, b} .
Proof : Suppose not. Let a and b be the first ranked outcomes according to P1 and P2
respectively with f(P ) = c where c 6= a, b. Note that a and b must also be distinct from
each other, otherwise we immediately contradict unanimity. Since a
w
∼ b, there exists B ⊂ A
and P ′1, P
′′
1 , P
′
2, P
′′
2 ∈ D such that (i) r1(P
′
1) = r1(P
′′
1 ) = a and r1(P
′
2) = r1(P
′′
2 ) = b, (ii)
B = M(a, b, P ′1) and B ⊂ W (b, P
′′
1 ), (iii) B = M(b, a, P
′
2) and B ⊂ W (a, P
′′
2 ). We consider
two cases.
Case 1: B = ∅. By replicating the arguments in Claim A in Sen (2001), we can show that
f(P ) ∈ {a, b}. This leads to a contradiction.
Case 2: B 6= ∅ . Observe that f(P1, P
′
2) cannot be b because 2 would manipulate at P via P
′
2.
Also note that f(P1, P
′
2) /∈ W (a, P
′
2). Otherwise 2 would manipulate via an ordering where
a is ranked first, thereby obtaining the outcome a (unanimity). We consider the following
two cases.
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Case 2.1: f(P1, P
′
2) = a. Strategy-proofness implies that f(P
′
1, P
′
2) = a.
Observe that f(P ′1, P2) 6= a because then 1 would manipulate at P via P
′
1. Also f(P
′
1, P2) /∈
W (b, P ′1), otherwise 1 would manipulate via an ordering where b is ranked first, thereby ob-
taining the outcome b (unanimity). Therefore, f(P ′1, P2) ∈ B ∪ b. If f(P
′
1, P2) ∈ B ∪ b, then
2 will manipulate at (P ′1, P
′
2) via P2 - a contradiction.
Case 2.2: f(P1, P
′
2) ∈ B. Let f(P1, P
′
2) = d. Then it must be the case that aP1dP1b. First we
show that f(P ′1, P
′
2) ∈ B. If f(P
′
1, P
′
2) ∈ W (b, P
′
1)
⋃
{b}, then 1 would manipulate at (P ′1, P
′
2)
via P1. If f(P
′
1, P
′
2) = a, then 1 would manipulate at (P1, P
′
2) via P
′
1. Therefore f(P
′
1, P
′
2) ∈ B.
Next we show that f(P ′1, P
′′
2 ) = a. If f(P
′
1, P
′′
2 ) = b, then 2 would manipulate at (P
′
1, P
′
2)
via P ′′2 . If f(P
′
1, P
′′
2 ) ∈ B, then 2 would manipulate at (P
′
1, P
′′
2 ) via an ordering where a is
ranked first, thereby obtaining the outcome a (unanimity). If f(P ′1, P
′′
2 ) ∈ W (b, P
′
1), then 1
would manipulate at (P ′1, P
′′
2 ) via an ordering where b is ranked first, thereby obtaining the
outcome b (unanimity). Therefore f(P ′1, P
′′
2 ) = a. At (P
′′
1 , P
′′
2 ), f(P
′′
1 , P
′′
2 ) = a, otherwise
1 would manipulate at (P ′′1 , P
′′
2 ) via P
′
1. Finally we show that f(P
′′
1 , P
′
2) = a. Note that
f(P ′′1 , P
′
2) 6= b, otherwise 2 would manipulate at (P
′′
1 , P
′′
2 ) via P
′
2. Also f(P
′′
1 , P
′
2) /∈ B,
otherwise 1 would manipulate at (P ′′1 , P
′
2) via an ordering where b is ranked first, thereby
obtaining the outcome b (unanimity). If f(P ′′1 , P
′
2) ∈ W (a, P
′
1), Then 2 would manipulate at
(P ′′1 , P
′
2) via an ordering where a is ranked first, thereby obtaining the outcome a (unanimity).
Therefore f(P ′′1 , P
′
2) = a. Note that 1 would manipulate at (P
′
1, P
′
2) via P
′′
1 because earlier
we have shown f(P ′1, P
′
2) ∈ B. This leads to a contradiction. 
Our proof consists in establishing the following two steps.
Step 1: Let X = {a1, a2, a3}. There exists j ∈ {1, 2} such that f(P ) = r1(Pj) for all
P ∈ DX × DX .
Step 2: Let X¯ = {a1, a2, . . . , al−1} and X
∗ = {a1, a2, . . . , al}, l = 4, . . . ,m. If f(P ) = r1(Pj)
for all P ∈ DX¯ × DX¯ , then f(P ) = r1(Pj) for all P ∈ D
X∗ × DX
∗
.
We proceed to establish Step 1 through a sequence of claims. First note that since D
is a β domain and σ is the identity function, we have a1
w
∼ a2, a2
w
∼ a3 and a3
w
∼ a1. By
Lemma 1, either f(P1, P2) = a1 or f(P1, P2) = a2 for all P ∈ D
2 such that r1(P1) = a1 and
r1(P2) = a2. Let P¯1 and P¯2 be such that r1(P¯1) = a1, r1(P¯2) = a2 and w.l.o.g. we assume
that f(P¯1, P¯2) = a1. We complete Step 1 by showing that agent 1 is the dictator. By Lemma
1 and strategy-proofness, f(P1, P2) = a1 for all P ∈ D
2 where r1(P1) = a1 and r1(P2) = a2.
The following pair of claims are required to establish Step 1.
Claim 1 For all P ∈ D2 where r1(P1) = a3 and r1(P2) = a2, f(P1, P2) = a3.
Proof : Suppose not. Then, there exists (P ′1, P
′
2) with r1(P
′
1) = a3 and r1(P
′
2) = a2 such that
f(P ′1, P
′
2) 6= a3. Lemma 1 implies that f(P
′
1, P
′
2) = a2. By lemma 1 and strategy-proofness,
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f(P1, P2) = a2 for all (P1, P2) ∈ D
2 with r1(P1) = a3 and r1(P2) = a2. Since a3
w
∼ a1, there
exists B ⊂ A, P ′′1 , and P
∗
1 such that r1(P
′′
1 ) = r1(P
∗
1 ) = a3, B = M(a3, a1, P
′′
1 ) and B ⊂
W (a1, P
∗
1 ). Note that either a2 ∈ B or a2 /∈ B. If a2 ∈ B, then f(P
∗
1 , P
′
2) 6= a2. Otherwise,
agent 1 would manipulate via an ordering where a1 is ranked first - a contradiction. If
a2 /∈ B, then f(P
′′
1 , P
′
2) 6= a2. Otherwise, agent 1 would manipulate via an ordering where
a1 is ranked first - a contradiction. 
Claim 2 For all P ∈ D2 where r1(P1) = a1 and r1(P2) = a3, f(P1, P2) = a1.
Proof : Suppose not. Then, there exists (P ′1, P
′
2) with r1(P
′
1) = a1 and r1(P
′
2) = a3 such that
f(P ′1, P
′
2) 6= a1. Lemma 1 implies that f(P
′
1, P
′
2) = a3. By Lemma 1 and strategy-proofness,
f(P1, P2) = a3 for all (P1, P2) ∈ D
2 with r1(P1) = a1 and r1(P2) = a3. Since a3
w
∼ a2,
there exists B ⊂ A, P ′′2 , and P
∗
2 such that r1(P
′′
2 ) = r1(P
∗
2 ) = a2, B = M(a2, a3, P
′′
2 ) and
B ⊂ W (a3, P
∗
2 ). Note that either a1 ∈ B or a1 /∈ B. If a1 ∈ B, then f(P
′
1, P
∗
2 ) = a2.
Otherwise if f(P ′1, P
∗
2 ) = a1, agent 2 would manipulate via an ordering where a3 is ranked
first - a contradiction. If a1 /∈ B, then f(P
′
1, P
′′
2 ) = a2. Otherwise, agent 2 would manipulate
via an ordering where a3 is ranked first - a contradiction. 
Using the arguments used in the proof of Claim 1 and 2, it is straightforward to show
that f(P ) = r1(P1) for all P ∈ D
X × DX . This establishes Step 1.
We now turn to Step 2. Pick an integer l in the set {4, . . . ,m}. We state our induction
hypothesis below.
Induction Hypothesis (IH): f(P ) = r1(P1) for all P ∈ D
X¯ × DX¯ .
Our objective is to show that f(P ) = r1(P1) for all P ∈ D
X∗ × DX
∗
.
Statement*: Since al is linked to {a1, . . . , al−1}, there exists ai, aj ∈ {a1, . . . , al−1} such that
al
w
∼ ai and al
w
∼ aj.
Claim 3 For all (P1, P2) ∈ D
2 such that P1 ∈ D
al and P2 ∈ D
{ai,aj}, f(P ) = r1(P1) (ai and
aj are as specified in (*)).
Proof : Suppose not. There exists an (P¯1, P¯2) ∈ D
2 such that P¯1 ∈ D
al , P¯2 ∈ D
{ai,aj} and
f(P¯1, P¯2) 6= al. Therefore by Lemma 1, f(P¯1, P¯2) = r1(P¯2). Let r1(P¯2) = ai - a similar
argument holds if r1(P¯2) = aj. Since al
w
∼ aj, there exists an ordering P
∗
1 such that (i)
r1(P
∗
1 ) = al and (ii) ajP
∗
1 ai. By Lemma 1 and strategy-proofness f(P
∗
1 , P¯2) = ai. Note
that agent 1 would manipulate at (P ∗1 , P¯2) via an ordering P
′
1 where r1(P
′
1) = aj because by
induction hypothesis f(P ′1, P¯2) = aj - a contradiction. 
Claim 4 For all (P1, P2) ∈ D
2 such that P1 ∈ D
al and P2 ∈ D
X¯ , f(P ) = r1(P1).
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Proof : In the view of Claim 3, we need to consider only the case where P2 ∈ D
ar where
ar ∈ {a1, . . . , al−1} and ar 6= ai, aj. Suppose there exists (P¯1, P¯2) such that r1(P¯1) = al,
r1(P¯2) = ar and f(P¯1, P¯2) 6= al. Since al
w
∼ ai, there exists B ⊂ A, P
′
1 and P
′′
2 such that
(i) r1(P
′
1) = al and r1(P
′′
2 ) = ai, (ii) B = M(al, ai, P
′
1) and B = M(ai, al, P
′′
2 ). By strategy-
proofness and IH, f(P ′1, P¯2) = B ∪ ai. Claim 3 implies that f(P
′
1, P
′′
2 ) = al. Therefore, agent
2 would manipulate at (P ′1, P
′′
2 ) via P¯2, contradicting the assumption of strategy-proofness.

Claim 5 For all (P1, P2) ∈ D
2 such that P1 ∈ D
{ai,aj} and P2 ∈ D
al, f(P ) = r1(P1) (here
too, ai and aj are as specified in (*)).
Proof : Suppose not. There exists an (P¯1, P¯2) ∈ D
2 such that P¯1 ∈ D
{ai,aj}, P¯2 ∈ D
al
and f(P¯1, P¯2) 6= r1(P¯1). Therefore by Lemma 1, f(P¯1, P¯2) = al. Let r1(P¯1) = ai - a similar
argument holds if r1(P¯1) = aj. Since al
w
∼ aj, there exists P
′
2 such that r1(P
′
2) = aj and alP
′
2ai.
Since, f(P¯1, P
′
2) = ai by IH, agent 2 would manipulate at (P¯1, P
′
2) via P¯2 - a contradiction.

Claim 6 Let ar
w
∼ as and ar, as ∈ {a1, a2, . . . , al−1}. If f(P ) = ar for all (P1, P2) ∈ D
2 such
that P1 ∈ D
ar and P2 ∈ D
al, then f(P ) = as for all (P1, P2) ∈ D
2 such that P1 ∈ D
as and
P2 ∈ D
al.
Proof : Suppose not. There exists an (P¯1, P¯2) ∈ D
2 such that P¯1 ∈ D
as , P¯2 ∈ D
al and
f(P¯1, P¯2) 6= as. Since ar
w
∼ as, there exists B ⊂ A, P
′
1 and P
′
2 such that (i) r1(P
′
1) = as and
r1(P
′
2) = ar, (ii) B = M(as, ar, P
′
1) and B = M(ar, as, P
′
2). By strategy-proofness and our
assumption, f(P ′1, P¯2) ∈ B ∪ ar. Since f(P
′
1, P
′
2) = as by IH, 2 would manipulate at (P
′
1, P
′
2)
via P¯2 - a contradiction. 
Claim 7 For all ar ∈ {a1, a2, . . . , al−1}, P1 ∈ D
ar and P2 ∈ D
al, f(P1, P2) = ar.
Proof : Pick ar ∈ {a1, a2, . . . , al−1}. Since D is a β domain, there must exist a sequence
b0, b1, . . . , bt ∈ {a1, a2, . . . , al−1} such that b0 = aj, bt = ar and b0
w
∼ b1, b1
w
∼ b2, . . . , bt−1
w
∼ bt.
By Claim 5, f(P ) = aj for all P ∈ D
2 where P1 ∈ D
aj and P2 ∈ D
al . Applying Claim 6
repeatedly, it follows that f(P ) = ar for all P ∈ D
2 where P1 ∈ D
ar and P2 ∈ D
al . 
Claims 3-7 establish Step 2. This completes the proof of the Theorem. 
Observation 2 Aswal et al. (2003) proved that linked domains are dictatorial. Since linked
domains are β domain, Theorem 2 clearly generalizes that of Aswal et al. (2003). We note
that β domain can be much smaller than linked domains. For instance, the domain in
Example 1 has eight orderings while the minimal linked domain with four alternatives has
ten orderings. In fact, the size of a minimal dictatorial domain is 2m, the bound that is
obtained by β domains in the case where m = 4.
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4 γ Domains
In this section, we consider a strengthening of the notion of weak connectedness. This
generates new conditions for dictatorial domains where the induced graph on alternatives
has fewer edges.
We introduce the notion of strong connectedness formally below.
Definition 10 A pair of alternatives aj, ak is strongly connected, denoted by aj ≈ ak if
aj
w
∼ ak and for all ar 6= aj, ak there exists Pi, P
′
i ∈ D such that
1. r1(Pi) = aj and arPiak.
2. r1(P
′
i ) = ak and arP
′
iaj.
In addition to weak connectedness, strong connectedness requires the following “interme-
diateness” property : for any alternative ar other than aj and ak, there exist two orderings
in the domain, one where ar is above ak while aj at the top and another where ar is above
aj while ak at the top.
Fix a domain D. The graph induced by strong connectedness G¯(D) is constructed in
the same way as G(D) with weak connectedness replaced by strong connectedness. In other
words, the set of vertices in G¯(D) is A and there is an edge {aj, ak} in G¯(D) if and only if
aj ≈ ak.
The objective of this paper is to show that G¯(D) requires “fewer” edges than G(D) in
order to be dictatorial. In particular, we will only require G¯(D) to be connected. 2
Definition 11 A domain D is a γ domain if G¯(D) is connected.
A γ domain may not be a β domain as the example below shows.
Example 2 Let A = {a1, a2, a3, a4, a5} and let Dˆ be the domain in Table 3.
P 1i P
2
i P
3
i P
4
i P
5
i P
6
i P
7
i P
8
i P
9
i P
10
i
a1 a1 a2 a2 a3 a3 a4 a4 a5 a5
a2 a4 a1 a4 a1 a5 a5 a2 a4 a1
a3 a3 a3 a5 a2 a4 a3 a1 a3 a2
a4 a5 a4 a3 a4 a2 a2 a3 a1 a3
a5 a2 a5 a1 a5 a1 a1 a5 a2 a4
Table 3: The domain Dˆ
The domain Dˆ is a γ domain. The induced graph G¯(Dˆ) (shown in Figure 2) is connected.
2This is the standard notion of a connected graph, i.e. a graph where there is a path between any two
vertices. A complete definition can be found inWest (2001).
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a1 a2 a3 a4 a5
Figure 2: The graph G¯(Dˆ)
If a domain is a β domain, then for every aj ∈ A, there exists ak and ar such that aj
w
∼ ak
and aj
w
∼ ar. However a5 is not weakly connected to a1 or a2 or a3. Therefore Dˆ is not a β
domain.
Example 3 Let A = {a1, a2, a3, a4, a5} and let D
∗ be the domain in Table 4. The graph
induced by D∗ is a star graph3 (shown in Figure 3). Since the star graph is connected, D∗ is
a γ domain.
P 1i P
2
i P
3
i P
4
i P
5
i P
6
i P
7
i P
8
i P
9
i P
10
i P
11
i P
12
i
a1 a1 a2 a2 a3 a3 a3 a4 a4 a4 a5 a5
a4 a3 a4 a5 a1 a2 a2 a1 a3 a3 a4 a3
a2 a5 a1 a3 a2 a4 a5 a5 a2 a5 a2 a1
a5 a2 a3 a1 a5 a1 a1 a2 a1 a1 a1 a4
a3 a4 a5 a4 a4 a5 a4 a3 a5 a2 a3 a2
Table 4: The domain D∗
a2
a1
a4
a3
a5
Figure 3: The star graph G¯(D∗)
The the following we show that the circular domain introduced in Sato (2010), is a γ
domain.
Definition 12 A domain is called a circular domain (Dc) if the elements of A can be
indexed a1, a2, . . . , am so that for each k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}, there exist two preferences Pi and
P ′i in D
c such that
(i) r1(Pi) = ak, r2(Pi) = ak+1 and rm(Pi) = ak−1.
3A graph G = (N,E) is a star graph if there exists a vertex a ∈ N (the center of the star) such that (i)
for all b ∈ N \ {a}, {a, b} is an edge in G and (ii) for all b, c ∈ N \ {a}, {b, c} is not an edge in G.
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(ii) r1(P
′
i ) = ak, r2(P
′
i ) = ak−1 and rm(P
′
i ) = ak+1.
(Let am+1 = a1 and a0 = am.)
Proposition 1 Dc is a γ domain.
Proof : First we show that for each k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}, {ak, ak+1} is an edge in G¯(D
c). Since
there exists P ′, P ′′ ∈ Dc where r1(P
′
i ) = ak, r2(P
′
i ) = ak+1, r1(P
′′
i ) = ak+1 and r2(P
′
i ) = ak,
ak and ak+1 are weakly connected. Pick an alternative b 6= ak, ak+1. Since there exists
P 1i , P
2
i ∈ D
c where r1(P
1
i ) = ak, rm(P
1
i ) = ak+1, r1(P
2
i ) = ak+1 and rm(P
2
i ) = ak, b is ranked
above ak+1 in P
1
i and also above ak in P
2
i . Therefore, ak ≈ ak+1 and {ak, ak+1} is an edge in
G¯(Dc). Since for each k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}, {ak, ak+1} is an edge in G¯(D
c), it is connected. 
Observation 3 G¯(Dc) is not a star graph.
Observation 4 A circular domain may or may not be a β domain. Chatterji and Sen
(2011) introduced a more restricted class of circular domains (which they also called circular
domains). These domains are β domain.
Observation 5 A β domain may not be a γ domain. For instance the domain in Example
1, is not a γ domain. The induced graph (shown in Figure 4) is not connected.
a1 a2 a3 a4
Figure 4: The graph G¯(D¯)
Our main result in this section shows that any D for which G¯(D) is connected, is dictato-
rial. Unfortunately, some extra conditions are needed in the very special case when G¯(D) is
a star graph. We are unable to show the dictatorial result for the star graph without addi-
tional conditions but we conjecture that the additional conditions are not required. In Parts
B and C of the Theorem below, we provide two independent conditions for the star-graph
case that ensure dictatoriality.
Theorem 3 Let D be a γ domain.
A. If G¯(D) is not a star graph, then D is dictatorial.
B. Let G¯(D) be a star graph and let a be the center of the star. If there exists b, c ∈ A\{a}
such that b
w
∼ c, then D is dictatorial.
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C. Let G¯(D) be a star graph and let a be the center of the star. If there exists P 1i , P
2
i , P
3
i , P
4
i ∈
D such that (i) r1(P
1
i ) = r1(P
2
i ) = b 6= a and r1(P
3
i ) = r1(P
4
i ) = c 6= a and (ii)
M(b, a, P 1i ) = W (a, P
2
i ) = M(c, a, P
3
i ) = W (a, P
4
i ), then D is dictatorial.
Proof : Let D be a γ domain and let f : D2 → A be a strategy-proof and unanimous scf 4.
Let G¯(D) be the induced connected graph. We will say a pair of alternatives a, b ∈ A
are neighbors if {a, b} is an edge in the graph G¯(D). Agent i ∈ {1, 2} is said to be decisive
over a ∈ A if for any P ∈ D2 with r1(Pi) = a, f(P ) = a. Agent i ∈ {1, 2} is dictator if i is
decisive over all alternatives in A.
Lemma 2 Let a and b be neighbors. For all i, j ∈ {1, 2}, if i is not decisive over a, then j
is decisive over b.
Proof : We assume that agent i is not decisive over a. If agent i is not decisive over a,
then we argue that f(P¯i, P¯j) 6= a, where r1(P¯i) = a and r1(P¯j) = b. If f(P¯i, P¯j) = a, then
applying Lemma 1, f(Pi, Pj) = a for all (Pi, Pj) ∈ D
2 such that r1(Pi) = a and r1(Pj) = b.
In that case, we argue that agent i is decisive over a. Suppose not. Then there exists a
profile P ′ ∈ D2, such that r1(P
′
i ) = a and f(P
′) = c 6= a. Since a ≈ b, there exist P ′′j with
r1(P
′′
j ) = b and cP
′′
j a. Therefore, agent j can manipulate at (P
′
i , P
′′
j ) via P
′
j .
By Lemma 1 and our assumption, f(P¯i, P¯j) = b. If f(P¯i, P¯j) = b, then applying Lemma
1, f(Pi, Pj) = b for all (Pi, Pj) ∈ D
2 such that r1(Pi) = a and r1(Pj) = b. Finally, we argue
that agent j is decisive over b. Suppose not. Then there exists a profile P ′ ∈ D2, such that
r1(P
′
j) = b and f(P
′) = c 6= b. Since a ≈ b, there exist P ′′i with r1(P
′′
i ) = a and cP
′′
j b.
Therefore, agent i can manipulate at (P ′′i , P
′
j) via P
′
i . 
Lemma 3 For any distinct a and b in A, it is impossible that agent 1 is decisive over a and
agent 2 is decisive over b.
Proof : Pick a profile P ∈ D2 such that r1(P1) = a and r1(P2) = b. Since agent 1 is decisive
over a, f(P ) = a. But f(P ) = b, because agent 2 is decisive over c. Therefore, the single-
valuedness of f is contradicted. 
Proof of Part A: Suppose G¯(D) is not a star graph. We show that f is dictatorial. First we
show the following claim.
Claim 8 For any a ∈ A, either agent 1 is decisive over a or agent 2 is decisive over a.
4In view of Proposition 3.1 of Aswal et al. (2003) and the fact that a γ domain is minimally rich, it suffices
to show that if f : D2 → A is strategy-proof and unanimous, then f is dictatorial.
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Proof : Suppose not. There exists an alternative a ∈ A such that either both the agents
are decisive over a or none of them are decisive over a. We consider the following two cases.
Case 1: Suppose both the agents are decisive over a. Since G¯(D) is connected and not a
star, there exists two edges {a, b} and {b, c} where a 6= c. By Lemma 3, both the agents are
not decisive over b. By Lemma 2, both the agents are decisive over c, because b and c are
neighbors. Since agent 1 is decisive over a and 2 is decisive over b, Lemma 3 is contradicted.
Case 2: Suppose none of the agents are decisive over a. Since G¯(D) is connected, there exists
an edge {a, b} in G¯(D). By Lemma 2, both the agents are decisive over b. Arguments in
case 1 can now be replicated with alternative a replaced by b to show a contradiction. 
Claim 9 There exists an agent who is decisive over all alternatives in A.
Proof : Let a be any element of A. By Claim 8, either agent 1 is decisive over a or agent
2 is decisive over a. W.l.o.g we assume that agent 1 is decisive over a. We complete the
proof by showing that 1 is decisive over all alternatives in A. Let b be any element of
A \ {a}. We show that agent 1 is decisive over b. Since G¯(D) is connected, there exists a
path (a = a1, a2, . . . , ak−1, ak = b) in G¯(D) from a to b. First, we show that if agent 1 is
decisive over ai then agent 1 is decisive over ai+1 for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k−1} and applying this
fact again and again we conclude that agent 1 is decisive over b. Note that ai and ai+1 are
neighbors in G¯(D). By Lemma 3, if agent 1 is decisive over ai, then agent 2 is not decisive
over ai+1. By Claim 8, agent 1 is decisive over ai+1. Therefore we conclude that agent 1 is
decisive over b. Because b was arbitrary, agent 1 is decisive over all alternatives in A. 
Claim 8 and Claim 9 establish Part A of the Theorem 3. 
Proof of Part B: Suppose G¯(D) is a star graph and let a be the center of the star. Let
b, c ∈ A \ {a} be such that b
w
∼ c. We show that f is dictatorial. First we show the following
claim.
Claim 10 It is impossible that agent 1 and 2 are both decisive over a.
Proof : Since b
w
∼ c, there exists B ⊂ A and P1, P2 ∈ D such that (i) r1(P1) = b and
r1(P2) = c, (ii) B = M(b, c, P1) and (iii) B = M(c, b, P2). By Lemma 1, f(P1, P2) is either
b or c. Let f(P1, P2) = b - a similar arguments works if f(P1, P2) = c. If a ∈ B, 2 would
manipulate at (P1, P2) via an ordering where a is ranked first because 2 is decisive over a -
a contradiction.
Suppose a /∈ B. Since a and c are neighbors, a
w
∼ c. Therefore, there exists B′ ⊂ A and
P ′2, P
′′
2 ∈ D such that (i) r1(P
′
2) = r1(P
′′
2 ) = c, (ii) B
′ = M(c, a, P ′2) and (iii) B
′ ⊂ W (a, P ′′2 ).
Lemma 1 and strategy-proofness imply that f(P1, P
′
2) = f(P1, P
′′
2 ) = b. If b ∈ B
′, 2 would
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manipulate at (P1, P
′′
2 ) via an ordering where a is ranked first because 2 is decisive over a.
Similarly, if b /∈ B′, 2 would manipulate at (P1, P
′
2) via an ordering where a is ranked first.
This completes the proof of the Claim. 
Claim 11 For any d ∈ A, either agent 1 is decisive over d or agent 2 is decisive over d.
Proof : Suppose not. Therefore, there exists an alternative d ∈ A such that either both the
agents are decisive over d or none of them are decisive over d. We consider following two
cases.
Case 1: Suppose both the agents are decisive over d. Claim 10 implies that d is not the
center of G¯(D). Since d and a are neighbors, Lemma 3 implies that agent 1 and 2 are not
decisive over a. By Lemma 2, both agents are decisive over c (6= a, d), because a and c are
neighbors. Since agent 1 is decisive over d and 2 is decisive over c, Lemma 3 is contradicted.
Case 2: In this case we consider that agent 1 and 2 are not decisive over d. First we argue
that d is the center of G¯(D). If d is not the center, Lemma 2 implies that agent 1 and 2 are
decisive over a - Claim 10 is contradicted. Therefore, d is the center of G¯(D). By Lemma 2,
both agents are decisive over two distinct non-central alternatives b and c. Since agent 1 is
decisive over b and 2 is decisive over c, Lemma 3 is contradicted. 
Claim 12 There exists an agent who is decisive over all alternatives in A.
Proof : Replacing Claim 8 by Claim 11 in the proof of Claim 9 we can establish this Claim.

Claim 10-12 establish Part A of the Theorem 3. 
Proof of Part C: Suppose G¯(D) is a star graph and let a be the center of the star. Let
P 11 , P
2
1 , P
3
2 , P
4
2 ∈ D be such that (i) r1(P
1
1 ) = r1(P
2
1 ) = b 6= a and r1(P
3
2 ) = r1(P
4
2 ) = c 6= a
and (ii) M(b, a, P 11 ) = W (a, P
2
1 ) = M(c, a, P
3
2 ) = W (a, P
4
2 ). We show that f is dictatorial.
First we show the following claim.
Claim 13 It is impossible that agent 1 and 2 are both decisive over a.
Proof : Suppose not, i.e. agent 1 and 2 are decisive over a. Let M(b, a, P 11 ) = W (a, P
2
1 ) =
M(c, a, P 32 ) = W (a, P
4
2 ) = B. By our assumption, b, c /∈ B. Now consider the preference
profile (P 11 , P
4
2 ). We show that f(P
1
1 , P
4
2 ) = b. Note that f(P
1
1 , P
4
2 ) /∈ B, otherwise 2 will
manipulate via an ordering where a is first-ranked. Since bP 42 a, f(P
1
1 , P
4
2 ) 6= a, otherwise 2
will manipulate via an ordering where b is first-ranked. Since 1 is decisive over a, f(P 11 , P
4
2 ) /∈
W (a, P 11 ). Therefore f(P
1
1 , P
4
2 ) = b.
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Strategy-proofness implies that f(P 21 , P
4
2 ) = b. We complete the proof of the claim by
showing that f(P 21 , P
3
2 ) /∈ A, because it contradicts with the fact that f is a function. Note
that f(P 21 , P
3
2 ) 6= c, otherwise 2 will manipulate at (P
2
1 , P
4
2 ) via P
3
2 . Also f(P
2
1 , P
3
2 ) /∈ B,
otherwise 1 will manipulate via an ordering where a is first-ranked. Since cP 21 a, f(P
2
1 , P
3
2 ) =
a, otherwise 1 will manipulate via an ordering where c is first-ranked. Since 2 is decisive
over a, f(P 21 , P
3
2 ) /∈ W (a, P
3
2 ). This completes the proof of the Claim. 
Claim 14 For any d ∈ A, either agent 1 is decisive over d or agent 2 is decisive over d.
Proof : Replacing Claim 10 by Claim 12 in the proof of Claim 11, we can establish this
Claim. 
Claim 15 There exists an agent who is decisive over all alternatives in A.
Proof : Replacing Claim 8 by Claim 14 in the proof of Claim 9, we can establish this Claim.

Claim 13-15 establish Part C of Theorem 3. 
This completes the proof of the Theorem. 
Observation 6 Since the graph induced by a circular domain is connected and not a star
graph (Observation 3), Part A of Theorem 3 generalizes the results in Sato (2010). Moreover,
the minimal size of a γ domain is 2m (Example 2).
Observation 7 For the star-graph case, there are domains for which the conditions speci-
fied in Part B and Part C do not hold - the domain in Example 3 is such an example.
Observation 8 The relationship between linked domains (Aswal et al. (2003)), circular do-
mains (Sato (2010)), circular domains (Chatterji and Sen (2011)), β domains and γ domains
is summarized as follows.
1. linked domains (Aswal et al. (2003)) ⊂ β domains.
2. circular domains (Chatterji and Sen (2011)) ⊂ circular domains (Sato (2010)) ⊂ γ
domains.
3. circular domains (Chatterji and Sen (2011)) ⊂ β domains.
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Ditatorial Domains
Linked Domains
β Domains
γ Domains
Cirular Domains (Sato (2010))
Cirular Domains (Chatterji and Sen (2011))
Figure 5: Diagrammatic representation of Observation 8
5 An Application
Consider a city with a hub. A finite number of citizens are located in the city but not at the
hub. However, their locations are directly connected to the hub by a road. A public facility
such as a hospital or a school has to be located in the city. The location decision is based
on the preferences of citizens which are private information. What are the scfs that induce
agents to report their preferences truthfully?
Let H be the hub of the city. Agents are located at a finite set of locations denoted
by a1, . . . , am, m ≥ 2. Agents’ preferences are restricted in the following manner: an agent
located at ai has one of the four orderings shown in Table 5.
Pi P¯i P
′
i P
′′
i
ai ai H H
H . ai .
. . . .
. . . .
. H . ai
Table 5: Possible Preferences of an agent located at ai
The rationale behind the preference restrictions is as follows. Some citizens want it either
at their location or at the hub - these citizens prefer proximity to the facility. Thus ai and
H take first two places in their ordering and are represented either by Pi or P
′
i . Some
citizens want it at any residential location rather than at the hub and most prefer it when
it is located near them - these preferences are represented by P¯i. Finally some citizens are
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affected by the congestion created by the facility and are strongly averse to it being located
near them. They most prefer it being located at the hub for easy access. Such preferences
are represented by P ′′i .
A domain with the four preference orderings in Table 5 for each ai, will be called a hub
domain and denoted by DH .
Proposition 2 A hub domain is a γ domain.
Proof : Let DH be a hub domain. First we show that for each k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}, {ak, H} is an
edge in G¯(DH). Since there exists P ′, P ′′ ∈ DH where r1(P
′
i ) = ak, r2(P
′
i ) = H, r1(P
′′
i ) = H
and r2(P
′
i ) = ak, ak and ak+1 are weakly connected. Pick an alternative b 6= ak, H. Since
there exists P 1i , P
2
i ∈ D
H where r1(P
1
i ) = ak, rm+1(P
1
i ) = H, r1(P
2
i ) = H and rm+1(P
2
i ) = ak,
b is ranked above H in P 1i and also above ak in P
2
i . Therefore, ak ≈ ak+1 and {ak, ak+1}
is an edge in G¯(Dc). Since for each k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}, {ak, H} is an edge in G¯(D
H), it is
connected. 
The induced graph by a hub domain may or may not be a star-graph. In either case, it
is a dictatorial domain.
Theorem 4 A hub domain is dictatorial.
Proof : Let DH be a hub domain. By Proposition 2, G¯(DH) is connected. If G¯(DH) is not
a star-graph, we are done by Part A of Theorem 3.
Suppose that G¯(DH) is a star-graph. Note that there exists P 1i , P
2
i , P
3
i , P
4
i ∈ D
H such
that (i) r1(P
1
i ) = r1(P
2
i ) = ai 6= H and r1(P
3
i ) = r1(P
4
i ) = aj 6= H and (ii) M(ai, H, P
1
i ) =
W (H,P 2i ) = M(aj, H, P
3
i ) = W (H,P
4
i ) = ∅. Therefore, by Part C of Theorem 3, D
H is
dictatorial. 
6 Conclusion
We have generalized the results of Aswal et al. (2003) in two different ways. Our results
generate new examples of dictatorial domains and also unify existing results by covering
some hitherto isolated cases.
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